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conclusion: the legislature intended
the Carmack Amendment to
provide uniformity in the rules and
regulations for common carriers and
predictability in determining the
extent of liability for lost or
damaged cargo. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit denied recovery of punitive
damages under the Carmack
Amendment, claiming that such an
award would displace the
Amendment's purpose.

Carmack Amendment Does
Not Absolutely Preempt State
Law and Common Law
Claims
Seventh Circuit precedent held
that the Carmack Amendment
preempts "state and common law
remedies.., where goods are
damaged or lost in interstate
commerce." Hughes v. United Van
Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir.
1987). Following this precedent, the
Seventh Circuit held that the
Carmack Amendment preempted
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of
contract for a common carrier and
willful and wanton misconduct
because the alleged damages in
these claims stemmed from the
damages to Slavin's property

already covered by the Carmack
Amendment. The Seventh Circuit
also held that the Carmack
Amendment preempted the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, although
some states do not hold such claims
preempted. In so holding, the
Seventh Circuit deferred to the only
Illinois appellate court to consider
the issue. The Illinois appellate
court in Nowakowski v. American
Red Ball Transit Co., 288 111. App.
3d 348 (1997) found that the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act is
preempted by the Carmack
Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt all of
Plaintiffs' state law claims. The
Seventh Circuit found that
Plaintiffs' intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim was not
preempted by the Carmack
Amendment because that claim
reflects a separate and independent
harm. In addition, the court, relying
on previous First Circuit and
Seventh Circuit decisions, also
recognized that the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt state
law claims that were separate from
the "actual loss of or damage to

cargo." See Rini v. United Van
Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.
1997); North American Van Lines,
Inc. v. Pinkerton Security Sys., Inc.,
89 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 1996); and
Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc.,
829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987).

Court Rejected United's
Cross-Appeal
Finally, the Seventh Circuit
addressed United's cross-appeal
where United alleged that the
$7,050 jury award was a "noneconomic" amount, and that the
Carmack Amendment strictly
prohibited the recovery of "noneconomic" damages. The court
disagreed. The jury in this case had
heard expert testimony from both
sides as to the potential value of the
photographs. Further, the jury
instructions specifically prohibited
the jury from considering "fanciful
or sentimental value" in assessing
the economic damages. The court
found that the jury acted within
these boundaries in awarding
Plaintiffs $7,050. This award was
economic and not based on "noneconomic" factors such as
sentiment.
NOW

Right to Jury Trial Found Under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
By HeatherAnn Miller
In Kobs v. Arrow Service
Bureau, Inc., 134 F.3d 893 (7th
Cir. 1998), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that a jury may determine the
statutory additional damages
provision of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
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("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C.
§1692k(a)(2)(A).

Collection Agency's Conduct:
Within Or Beyond the Law?
Plaintiffs, Ron and Stacie Kobs
("Plaintiffs"), brought suit against

Defendant, Arrow Service Bureau,
Inc. ("Arrow"), alleging that Arrow
violated Plaintiffs' rights under the
FDCPA when it attempted to collect
a debt allegedly owed by Plaintiffs
to American TV. Arrow, a debt
collection agency, had previously
purchased debts owed to American
Volume 10, number 2
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TV. Following an initial collection
letter to Plaintiffs' former address,
Arrow contacted Plaintiffs by
telephone. Plaintiffs stated that they
no longer resided at the address to
which Arrow sent its initial letter.
Arrow then sent the letter to the
Plaintiffs' correct address.
During January 1996, after
Plaintiffs received their initial
collection letter from Arrow, Mrs.
Kobs received more than five calls
from Arrow, and Mr. Kobs received
between one and three calls. These
calls continued even though
Plaintiffs informed Arrow that a
credit bureau report confirmed no
balance was due by Plaintiffs to
American TV. Plaintiffs claim that
Sharon Tobias, an Arrow employee
who made the majority of calls to
Plaintiffs' residence, was "rude and
disrespectful."
Plaintiffs eventually hired an
attorney and notified Arrow of this
fact in a subsequent telephone call.
In violation of its own policy
against directly contacting
consumers who were represented by
counsel, Arrow continued calling
Plaintiffs' home demanding
payment. On April 22, 1996, weeks
after Plaintiffs informed Arrow that
they had retained an attorney and
requested Arrow to direct its
communications to him, Arrow sent
a letter threatening to sue Plaintiffs
if they failed to contact Arrow or
mail a payment within seven days.
Although Plaintiffs failed to
respond to Arrow's threat, Arrow
did not file suit. Arrow finally
contacted Plaintiffs' attorney three
months after being informed of
Plaintiffs' representation. However,
in a subsequent call to Plaintiffs on
May 8, 1996, Tobias indicated that,
after speaking with Plaintiffs'
attorney, she felt the attorney had no
knowledge of Plaintiffs' case.
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Subsequently, the Plaintiffs
brought suit under several theories
of unlawful collection practices
which violated the FDCPA.
Specifically, the suit alleged: (1)
that Arrow failed "to provide the
requisite statutory validation and
dispute notice within five days of its
initial communication with the
[Plaintiffs] in violation of
1692g(a);" (2) that Arrow negated
its validation notice to the Plaintiffs
by the language it used on the
notice's reverse side in violation of
§1692g(a); (3) that Arrow's
telephone calls harassed Plaintiffs
in violation of § 1692d; (4) that
Arrow's communication with
Plaintiffs after receiving notice that
they had legal representation
violated §I692c(a)(2); (5) that
Arrow violated §1692e(1 0) by
threatening litigation which it had
no intention of pursuing; (6) that
Arrow's letter, which threatened
litigation if the bill was not paid in
seven days, violated § 1692e(l 0); (7)
that Arrow's failure to communicate
the conditions for property
exemptions violated § 1692e(1 0);
and (8) that Arrow's claim that
Plaintiffs' attorney had no
knowledge of their case constituted
harassment and deception in
violation of § 1692d and 1692e(10).
The district court granted
Arrow's pre-trial motion that a
judge, rather than a jury, determine
what statutory additional damages,
if any, should be granted. In
addition, the court denied Plaintiffs'
request that the court use a special
verdict form in determining the
amount of these damages.
A jury found Arrow liable under
the FDCPA for violating the Kob's
FDCPA rights and awarded Mrs.
Kobs $1,500 in actual damages. The
judge then awarded Mr. Kobs $100
in statutory damages pursuant to

§ 1692(a)(2)(A). Mrs. Kobs received
no statutory damages, and Mr. Kobs
received no actual damages. The
Plaintiffs' appealed the verdict
based on the judge's decision to
bifurcate the damages determination
between the jury and the judge.

Seventh CircuitAnalyzed
§1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA
Initially, the Seventh Circuit
noted that only one federal appellate
court had previously addressed
whether § 1692k(a)(2)(A) of the
FDCPA provided for a jury trial to
determine statutory damages. In
Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection
Service, 677 F.2d 830 (11th Cir.
1982), the Eleventh Circuit
answered this issue in the
affirmative. In so holding, the court
stated that statutory causes of action
provide a right to a jury trial in two
instances, namely: (1) where
Congress provides for a jury trial as
a part of a specific statutory
provision; or (2) where the statutory
provision is of a type usually
enforced in an action at law.
The Sibley court construed the
language of § 1692k(a)(2)(A),
providing for "such additional
damages as the court may allow, but
not exceeding $1,000," as meaning
that the parties are entitled to trial
by either judge or jury. The court
relied on previous decisions which
construed similar statutory
provisions. See Sibley, 677 F.2d at
832. Furthermore, the Sibley court
found that this interpretation of the
FDCPA avoided any possibility of
serious constitutional issues that
could be raised under the Seventh
Amendment if the Act was
construed to prohibit a jury trial.
Based on the Sibley court's
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit
rejected Arrow's original contention
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that statutory damages must only be
determined by a judge.
The Sibley court had also
questioned how rights under the
FDCPA were decided historically,
either at law by a jury or in equity
by a judge, to determine whether the
Seventh Amendment mandated a
jury trial. See Sibley, 677 F.2d at
833. The court in that case
concluded that rights under the
FDCPA were similar to tort actions
for monetary relief. Historically,
courts of law decided such an action
and request for relief. Due to the
nature of the action and the relief
sought, the Sibley court held that
the language of 1692k(a)(2),
allowing statutory damages to be
determined by the "court,"
encompassed trial by jury under the
Seventh Amendment.

Seventh Circuit Applied
Sibley and Other Precedent
The Seventh Circuit found the
factual distinction between Sibley,
where a single trier of fact decided
actual and statutory damages, and
the present case, where the jury
awarded actual damages and the
judge awarded statutory damages,
insignificant. The Seventh Circuit
interpreted the holding in Sibley,
which failed to distinguish actual
damages from statutory damages, to
mean "that a party is entitled to a
jury trial for all damages under the
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FDCPA."
The Seventh Circuit also relied
on the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d
216 (4th Cir. 1978). In Barber, the
Fourth Circuit held that a jury
should determine the issue of
statutory damages under a provision
of the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §1640(a).
Based on the interpretation of the
analogous provision in Barber,the
Seventh Circuit stated "that
statutory damages, standing alone,
should be submitted to the jury."
The Seventh Circuit noted that
the TILA and the FDCPA both
provide for actual and statutory
damages for the "prevailing
consumer." Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit's holding relied on the
Supreme Court's unanimous
decision in Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974), which upheld the
defendant's right to a jury trial in an
action for actual and punitive
damages brought under Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §3601-3631. In Curtis, the
Supreme Court held that a civil
rights action could be tried by a jury
because it sounded in tort and
sought the type of relief
traditionally awarded at law.
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held
that a TILA action sounded in tort
and requested a form of reliefmonetary damages - traditional to
a court of law, thus providing for a

trial by jury. See Barber, 577 F.2d at
225.

Section 1692k(a)(2) Provides
for a Jury Trial
The Seventh Circuit adopted the
Sibley court's interpretation of the
word "court" in §1692k(a)(2)(A)
holding that the FDCPA provides
for a jury trial. In addition, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that
Barberresolved any ambiguity over
whether a jury should decide the
issue of statutory damages standing
alone. In this regard, the court
noted the similarity in the damages
provisions under the TILA and the
FDCPA as well as the nature of
these actions, which historically
would be decided at law and thus
would fall within the protection of
the Seventh Amendment. Because
the trial judge, not the jury, decided
the issue of statutory damages in the
present case, the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to
the district court to allow a jury to
consider the amount of statutory
damages, if any, to award Plaintiffs
for Arrow's violations of the
FDCPA.
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